Russian Premier League: Attendance Records, Financial Challenges, and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Interviewer: Good day, we have Maxim Mitrofanov, the Secretary General of the Russian Football Union, in our studio. Maxim Lvovich, welcome. The first round of the new Russian football championship is approaching, and the offseason has been filled with significant events that have sparked much discussion. I`d like to start our conversation not with the “Torpedo” incident, but with financial matters. The previous season concluded with the bankruptcy of FC Khimki, and the situation with “Krylia Sovetov” has remained uncertain for nine months due to financial difficulties. Today, we will primarily discuss money in football. Why do clubs go bankrupt? For Premier League clubs in our history, this is the first such instance, and perhaps not the last.

Maxim Mitrofanov: Let`s differentiate these situations. Khimki went bankrupt after concluding their participation in the previous season`s Russian championship. Perhaps we should go back a bit and mention that the Russian Football Union conducts an annual licensing procedure for clubs to allow them to participate in the sports season. What is licensing? It`s a minimum set of standards a football club must meet to be recognized as professional and be eligible to participate in a certain level of competition based on sporting merit. Licensing provides certain guarantees that the club is viable, including financially. The purpose of the licensing procedure is to ensure guarantees for the competition organizer that the club, in all its aspects, complies and can complete the season. However, the operational activities of clubs during the season are the responsibility of their management. Even if a club demonstrates its viability on the licensing date, its subsequent performance depends on the actions taken by its managers.

Interviewer: Taking “Krylia Sovetov” as an example, which isn`t bankrupt yet, how is the club`s economy structured? Is it through aid, subsidies, contributions, in this case, from the regional government? In other instances, we know that title sponsors, team owners, and very large state-owned companies provide assistance. But why, for example, did “Khimki” go bankrupt? There isn`t much transparency, but everyone seems to think that the financial deterioration isn`t because they earned less real money, but because they started receiving fewer subsidies—that their donors are no longer willing to pay as much. Am I right?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Khimki went bankrupt because the Russian Football Union did not issue them a license for the next season; they lost their professional status. None of their shareholders or participants wished to continue financing the club to embark on a four-year journey back to the Russian Premier League. That`s why Khimki specifically went bankrupt. If we analyze Krylia Sovetov, the situation is completely different. Since 2012, Krylia Sovetov has had a debt to one of Rostec`s subsidiaries. They periodically repay this debt, so it decreases over a certain period. The parties consistently reached agreements to extend the debt. However, it seems the moment came when Rostec was no longer willing to wait. Nevertheless, FC Krylia Sovetov provided the RFU with sufficient guarantees and demonstrated new funding sources that will cover this debt. Therefore, concerning Krylia Sovetov, we have more than enough assurances that Krylia will comfortably finish the season and should enter the next season as financially stable.

Interviewer: But still, football clubs — in the Premier League, top leagues, say, in Europe — are televised, they sell merchandise, they have masses of fans. We`d like to see these clubs be financially self-sufficient, so that 50-60% of their budget doesn`t have to be subsidized by various donors?

Maxim Mitrofanov: That is indeed a goal for both regulators, competition organizers, and the professional clubs themselves. Naturally, they aspire to be as stable and independent as possible in their existence. You`ve almost perfectly outlined the income structure that funds professional sports, specifically professional football: revenues from sponsors and advertisers, income from the centralized sale of television rights, revenues from match day events—meaning tickets, food, merchandising at stadiums—and income from transfer activities, which includes developing and selling players. These are the four primary sources of funding for football clubs. For successful development, a balance needs to be found among all these areas. For a long time, we lacked a significant income component: revenues from the centralized sale of media rights. Through the joint efforts of the RFU and the clubs, we`ve done extensive work. Since 2021, for example, the profitability of the Russian Premier League has increased fivefold, the Russian Super Cup fourteenfold, and the Russian Cup sixteenfold.

Interviewer: Is this regarding the sale of television rights?

Maxim Mitrofanov: It`s related to the sale of television rights and commercial advertising rights.

Interviewer: Then I`ll immediately ask about tickets: we all know about Fan ID. We remember the pandemic and everything associated with it. Then Fan ID also appeared. What were the losses from this? The confrontation with the fan community hasn`t ended, has it?

Maxim Mitrofanov: When any new system is introduced, it tends to meet some resistance. It`s a new administrative step that needs to be taken: yesterday I just went to football, now I need to register somewhere, download an app, mark something in it, and so on. Indeed, in the first season after the introduction of Fan ID, we observed a certain drop in attendance: the average attendance for Premier League matches was around 9,000 people. Today, it is recovering and has approximately reached 12,500 people per match. The goal we`ve set for the Russian Premier League—the KPI, as it`s fashionably called, included in our contract with them—is an average attendance of 16,000 per match in the Russian Premier League.

Interviewer: But that`s still less, as I read, than the period before the pandemic.

Maxim Mitrofanov: That 16,000 figure is precisely the indicator for the best season in the history of Russian football, the 2018-2019 season. That was the season after the FIFA World Cup, and essentially the only pre-pandemic season. We are returning to those attendance levels. Moreover, the Fan ID system is becoming convenient for fans. It`s worth noting that currently, there are virtually no offenses at Russian football stadiums; it`s one of the safest not only sports competitions in the country but also events in general. The Fan ID system allows for very convenient ticket acquisition, remote transfer of tickets to friends; you no longer need to worry about paper tickets, they don`t get lost, they can`t be forged, and the system is quite effective in combating touts. At least, clubs and the Ministry of Digital Development can, if necessary, track such negative phenomena. And if you look, we now have leading clubs in terms of fan engagement.

Interviewer: Who are they?

Maxim Mitrofanov: They are Zenit, Krasnodar, and Rostov. These clubs are the absolute leaders in the number of fan cards issued. Currently, in absolute figures, 2.6 million fan cards have been issued, of which 900,000 were issued in 2024, and 190,000 of those are for children. Among Moscow clubs, Spartak is the leader; they increased the number of fans and issued cards by 15% last year. Following them are CSKA and Lokomotiv. These are the six leading clubs, the absolute leaders of our football in terms of fan engagement and growth rates.

Interviewer: What dynamics do ticket sales revenues show?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Ticket sales revenues are growing. Taking large clubs as an example, each club has stadiums of different capacities and, accordingly, different operating costs for these stadiums. Well, top championship matches have long been generating over 100 million rubles in ticket revenue alone for each such match.

Interviewer: For each match?

Maxim Mitrofanov: For each match.

Interviewer: So, do we correctly understand that this immediately means more than 3 billion rubles for the championship?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Large stadiums, such as Gazprom Arena and Lukoil Arena, are those that, with competent management, can easily generate around 2.5-3 billion rubles in revenue from hosting events. However, these also come with significant costs for stadium maintenance. Even if it`s just standing there, with nothing happening, it costs money, and matches are also expensive. Nevertheless, the general trend is that clubs are becoming profitable.

Interviewer: Often, when discussing the economics of Russian football, it`s a common refrain among all football commentators that salaries in Russian football are comparatively higher than in Europe. This is because there are top clubs and top leagues where players have different values and levels, but the same player might earn less in Europe and more in Russia. Even Russian footballers play for more money in Russia than they would if they went to Europe; they leave for less money. Is this just an internal competition, a bubble, if we`re talking about economics?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Firstly, market elements are still present. When clubs decide on player salaries, they are in competition with each other. This competition, in part, drives a certain price increase. Secondly, it`s important to note where top players of the Russian national football team play: Golovin, Safonov, Miranchuk, Zakharyan. These are players who play abroad. They chose French, Spanish, American, and in some cases, Swiss football clubs, and their earnings there are either comparable or higher. It`s important to understand that the Russian Premier League, in terms of profitability per football club and for the championship as a whole, is the sixth strongest competition in Europe. We are right behind France, which rounds out the big five strongest football leagues, although we are practically 2.2 times behind it in terms of profitability. At the same time, certain rules present in our market, including rules related to protecting and providing playing time for Russian players—the so-called legionnaire limit, which restricts foreign players` labor—some time ago indeed fostered a trend of increasing salaries for Russians. In 2021, together with the Ministry of Sport, we changed our approach to the legionnaire limit and established a new formula. This new formula did not lead to an overabundance of foreign players; clubs don`t even use the maximum number of slots they could claim in their roster, and the ratio of playing time between foreign players and Russians on the field is roughly 50-50. So, we have a very balanced championship that aligns with the best European and global practices. Consequently, the phenomenon that occurred in the mid-2010s, where one could pay insane money and salaries for a top Russian player, is gradually fading away. Nevertheless, for the strongest players, as in any market relationship, there is heightened competition, and a strong Russian player can selectively choose between our top clubs and increase their value.

Interviewer: Is this often a competition among donors?

Maxim Mitrofanov: I disagree. Here, it`s also important to look, for example, at where the top players of the Russian national football team play: Golovin, Safonov, Miranchuk, Zakharyan. These are players who play abroad. These are players who made their choice in favor of French, Spanish, American, in some cases Swiss, football clubs. Accordingly, there they receive sums that are not less than or greater for their work. One must generally understand that the Russian Premier League, in terms of profitability per football club and the entire championship, is the sixth competition in Europe. That is, we are immediately behind France, which closes the big five strongest football leagues. True, we are practically 2.2 times behind it in terms of this very profitability. But at the same time, certain rules that exist in our market, including rules related to the protection and provision of playing time for Russian players, the so-called limit on foreign players, some time ago precisely formed the trend of increasing salaries for Russians. In 2021, together with the Ministry of Sport, we changed the approach to the limit on foreign players, establishing a new formula. This new formula ultimately did not lead to an overabundance of foreign players; clubs do not even use the maximum number of slots they could declare in their roster, and the ratio of time spent by foreign players and Russians on the field is approximately 50/50. That is, we have a very balanced championship that corresponds to the best European and world practices. And, accordingly, the phenomenon that occurred in the mid-2010s, when one could pay insane money and insane salaries for a top Russian, is gradually fading away. Nevertheless, of course, for the strongest players, as in any market relationship, there is increased competition, and a strong Russian player can selectively choose between our top clubs and increase their value.

Interviewer: Returning to the topic of the bubble, the competition among donors, the competition among governors, large companies – we have Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Rostec as title sponsors of our major clubs. There`s still a suspicion that our financial fair play isn`t quite European, that to some extent we have a bubble inflated by large sponsors, a competition of giants who are on the other side of football. These are all closed stories, but they constantly spill over into sports journalism.

Maxim Mitrofanov: In public opinion, there might indeed be a perception that some bubble is inflating, and a competition is occurring among state corporations and companies with state participation. However, I want to assure you that this is not the case. Firstly, the market has stabilized quite some time ago, and the revenues clubs receive from their sponsors are roughly consistent year to year. There isn`t a situation where contracts from most sponsors, especially state-owned companies, increase annually. Secondly, it`s crucial to understand that all these companies spend money strictly within the existing legislation, including tax legislation, and there are limits on their advertising expenses. Therefore, all expenses they incur, including on professional sports, fall within the restrictive barriers set by federal law. So, again, what to spend on – television advertising, billboard advertising, or advertising in professional sports – in this case, each company decides based on its marketing goals and objectives.

Interviewer: More about money. Recently, Dynamo`s General Director Pavel Pivovarov stated that the commercial benefit of his club`s participation in the Russian Cup is small, amounting to only 100 million rubles. Is this a lot or a little? Why is 100 million rubles too little for Dynamo?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Not long ago, in 2019, the total budget for the entire Russian Cup was 60 million rubles. Currently, the contract is about 3 billion rubles, and consequently, the funds we allocate for distribution among clubs as prize money now amount to 1.6 billion rubles per year per season. Again, these are prize funds.

Interviewer: In the Russian Cup?

Maxim Mitrofanov: In the Russian Cup, yes, we are talking exclusively about the Russian Cup. What is prize money? Prize money is the funds you receive depending on the result of the match you played. Naturally, as you approach the final and win it, the amount of funds you receive also changes and increases.

Interviewer: And how much is it for the final now?

Maxim Mitrofanov: For comparison, the winner of the current Russian Cup season, FC CSKA, earned 300 million rubles in prize money from the Russian Cup. But at the moment, we are only talking about prize money, that is, only the payment the club receives from the Russian Football Union. At the same time, we do not centralize the rights that clubs sell to their sponsors, so about 30% of all advertising time and opportunities are realized by clubs through their own contracts. And here, to be completely honest, one needs to calculate the specific weight of each match in the contract with all sponsors that the club concludes, and the club has only two official competitions in which it participates – the MIR RPL and the FONBET Russian Cup. Therefore, the specific weight of each match is significantly higher. And, accordingly, then there are revenues from ticket sales, revenues from the sale of merchandise and food during football matches, so the total revenue from participating in each official match is significantly higher, and it is incorrect to evaluate it exclusively as prize money paid for achieving a sporting result; after all, one can always advise playing better.

Interviewer: When “Dynamo” says “100 million rubles,” do they mean some hypothetical amount?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Why? 100 million rubles is the amount of prize money Dynamo received based on their sporting result.

Interviewer: For the last season?

Maxim Mitrofanov: For the last season. Accordingly, Spartak earned more, Zenit earned more, Rostov earned more, CSKA earned the most. CSKA also reached the Super Cup, won it, and will earn another, I think, about 150 million in prize money – a very decent sum that they can spend on their own development, which, I am sure, knowing the professionalism of CSKA management, they will do.

Interviewer: When we listed the revenue streams for our clubs, we didn`t mention bookmakers. As far as I know, they now play a significant role for the Premier League, the RFU, and the clubs.

Maxim Mitrofanov: That is indeed true. The betting market in Russia is developing rapidly and is, both by our estimates and those of international regulators like UEFA, the largest betting market in the world. The volume of Russia`s betting market is larger than that of the US, Germany, the UK, and so on.

Interviewer: Is there any theoretical explanation for why this is the case?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Here, it`s more appropriate to speak with specialists within that market. From the perspective that betting in Russia is only possible on sports, betting companies are naturally interested in the development of sports, in quality broadcasts, and in the integrity of sports, because unpredictability of results is key to their business. And betting is changing the structure of television rights sales. Whereas before we talked about a subscription model for distributing television rights—where you had to pay for each football match via NTV+, special Match TV apps, and so on—today, betting companies pay precisely so that matches are shown on free-to-air television, so everyone can watch, and they are willing to pay for this to television channels, clubs, or competition organizers.

Interviewer: So, what does Russian football gain from this enormous industry, which, as I`ve just learned, is larger in Russia than anywhere else?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Clubs receive prize money or direct advertising revenues from betting companies, which they then spend according to their objectives—some develop infrastructure, some invest in youth football, some buy players and pay their salaries. The Russian Football Union primarily invests everything in the development of youth sports. All its revenues are either distributed as prize money or invested in the development of youth sports and the maintenance of national teams.

Interviewer: I must ask you about the situation with “Torpedo,” and also the questionable situation with FC Sochi player Vladimir Pisarsky, who was placing bets with betting companies, often correctly. I won`t recount the “Torpedo” situation, as I assume everyone has heard what happened. To what extent can we say this is a systemic problem?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Actually, I believe that the work carried out by the Russian Football Union in cooperation with law enforcement agencies has led to further purification of the industry, demonstrating that if anyone attempts to engage in such activities, as in the “Torpedo” case, it will not go unpunished or unnoticed. We will certainly detect it and punish it. Consequently, club officials and referees have realized that sooner or later, they will be caught and suspended, which is the least that could happen to them, as there is also criminal liability.

Interviewer: The referee community was heavily criticized this season. And they were criticized, among other things, for the fact that in cases of certain controversial decisions, and there were many, the highest qualification council, the oversight body, never spoke out against the referees. Is this normal?

Maxim Mitrofanov: Well, look, that`s not entirely true, or even not true at all. Firstly, referees have always made mistakes and will continue to do so; here, one must look at the dynamics, quantity, and severity of these errors. And the dynamic is such that judges make fewer mistakes every year. And, accordingly, the emergence of new technologies, such as the Video Assistant Referee (VAR), allows for correcting errors made on the football field. A footballer`s mistake, who misses an open goal from a meter away, cannot be corrected, but a referee`s mistake in the same situation can be corrected, and if it occurs, it is done in the maximum number of cases. As for the conclusions of the expert refereeing commission, firstly, it is also very important to understand that sometimes the commission`s conclusion is still the conclusion of experts who understand the rules of the game. And they analyze whether a referee`s mistake occurred from the perspective of the rules, not from the perspective of our emotional perception. Because as fans, we can evaluate the game however we like.

Interviewer: But even within the rules, there are still subjective moments, for example, parts of the hand, the movement of the hand.

Maxim Mitrofanov: The rules are absolutely subjective; this precise detailing they are trying to implement now, I believe, is confusing the referees themselves. This isn`t just an issue for us; it`s a global trend where they revise the approach to what constitutes “handball” twice a year and still can`t agree or define what it actually is. And they delve into deeper and deeper complexities. This casuistry leads to confusion about how one instance differs from another. You see, the ball touched a centimeter over here, so in this case it`s handball, but in that case, it`s not. Everything is so subjective that fans start recalling the golden age of Maradona`s “Hand of God.” A player scored a goal with his hand, the referee didn`t notice. A legend.

Interviewer: What about the actions of the referee who specifically favored “Torpedo”?

Maxim Mitrofanov: The actions of the referee who favored “Torpedo” were initially uncovered through a referee analysis, and that analysis then formed the basis for a criminal case, supported by evidence collected by law enforcement agencies. However, this case is still under investigation and has not yet even reached the RFU. Why was the “Torpedo” club suspended? “Torpedo” was suspended for a different violation—an attempt to bribe a referee, which did not affect the match result in any way. The referee reported the attempted bribery beforehand. Accordingly, there was a signal from the referee: “They are trying to bribe me, what should I do?”

Interviewer: And this was documented.

Maxim Mitrofanov: And then, in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and under their supervision, he undertook certain actions that led, among other things, to a criminal case. And also to a disciplinary case, which was reviewed by our control and disciplinary committee, resulting in “Torpedo” being excluded.

Interviewer: What will happen to “Torpedo” as a result? Will they simply go play in the First League?

Maxim Mitrofanov: “Torpedo” has been designated as a participant in the First League competitions for this season, already under new club management.

Interviewer: Many believe this is too lenient a punishment.

Maxim Mitrofanov: I absolutely agree. However, the individuals involved have received personal penalties from us and will, I am sure, receive further punishment imposed by the court. From the perspective of “Torpedo” as a football club, as a social phenomenon with fans and a rich history, one must consider the alternative: the next decision would be the loss of professional status and the de facto liquidation of the football club, with the possibility of its restoration and return to professional football at this level in approximately five to six years. So, when such a choice is on the scales, and “Torpedo” has been purged of the people who committed the relevant actions, the decision was made that the punishment was sufficient. After all, not playing in the championship, in terms of status and the money the championship generates, is a very serious penalty.